The New Non-State Actors: How Technology Companies are Becoming Foreign Policy Actors

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Ukrainian communication infrastructure came under serious pressure. The use of satellite internet became extremely important, since it provided a way of connecting that was not reliant on terrestrial infrastructure. The United States Agency for International Development reported that it had partnered with SpaceX to provide thousands of Starlink terminals to Ukraine for civilian use, while other governments and donors provided terminals as well. Starlink has both a civilian and a military use: the latter has been discussed extensively, with research from the Carnegie Endowment highlighting that private technology companies were providing satellite communication links, commercial satellite imagery, and AI-supported intelligence services to Ukraine.

International Relations has been dominated by one idea for a long time: that states are the most important actors in world politics. The decisions of governments create foreign policy, the actions of diplomats lead to treaties and alliances, and the organization of armies’ controls warfare. Companies were considered economic actors and their main goal was to make profits. This is no longer true.

Technological companies can now provide internet to soldiers during a war, control access to satellite communication, influence the information sphere, create software crucial for national security or artificial intelligence systems used by states. In some cases, the decision of a company executive can have effects comparable to a foreign policy decision. One of the most high-profile examples of this trend involves SpaceX’s Starlink communication service, which was crucial for Ukrainian forces following Russia’s full-scale invasion. The importance of Starlink was such that its access could potentially shape war outcomes and military strategies. In practice, the relationship between states and technology companies is becoming much more complicated.

A non-state actor is an individual, organization, or institution that can influence international affairs without being a government. International institutions, NGOs, multinational corporations, terrorist groups, media companies, and technology firms are all potential examples of non-state actors. Technology firms such as SpaceX, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon, Apple, Nvidia and major AI companies are no longer only selling products their technologies are deeply integrated into the fabric of everyday life.

This gives technology companies a unique status. A recent study outlines three potential roles for technology companies in geopolitics: being an object of geopolitical competition, acting as an arena to pursue geopolitical objectives, and being an agent that pursues its own geopolitical goals. This framework is helpful because it shows that a technology company can act as all three at once. For example, a government may restrict the operations of a foreign technology company because it is viewed as a national-security risk. At the same time, this technology company may provide critical infrastructure to a government, and its own decisions may have geopolitical consequences.

A country can have a strong military, but if its communication infrastructure, digital infrastructure or provision of essential digital services is reliant on other countries, it is strategically weakened. This is why governments are now talking about digital sovereignty and technological sovereignty. For example, the United Nations Development Programme has recently been looking at alternatives that would let governments develop AI applications without relying on major American cloud providers. The concern is understandable: governments do not want their sensitive data or critical digital infrastructure to be reliant on firms based in other countries.

A government is accountable, at least theoretically, to elections, courts, parliaments and constitutions. If a government takes a controversial decision, its citizens and political institutions can challenge it. But if a company takes a controversial decision regarding its satellite network, AI system or digital platform, the process may be much less transparent. The recent academic discussion of “corporate quasi-sovereignty” touches on this issue precisely: companies that control critical infrastructure can wield significant discretion without having the accountability of a government.

• It would be wrong to say that SpaceX, Microsoft, Google or AI companies are becoming states.
• They do not have territory in the traditional sense, nor do they possess passports, armies or sovereignty.
• But they can possess strategic dependence.
• If a government cannot easily replace the service of a company, it finds itself in a dependent position.

This is similar to the concept of soft power, but it is not identical. Soft power usually refers to a government’s ability to attract others on the basis of values, culture or diplomacy. Technology companies wield a different type of influence one based on infrastructure and access. If you control the infrastructure, you do not necessarily command people but you can influence the limits of what is possible. Therefore, the rise of technology companies represents a transformation in the nature of power.

Pakistan is becoming increasingly reliant on digital infrastructure, cloud services, social media platforms, satellite communication and artificial intelligence. As Pakistan’s digital economy develops, its reliance on foreign technology companies can bring both opportunities and risks. Technology partnerships can help Pakistan build its education system, cybersecurity capacity, telecommunications infrastructure, artificial intelligence capabilities and economic development. At the same time, excessive reliance on foreign technology can raise questions about data security, technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy.